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HIRR KRUPP 
--
A cm3~ st;1dy for the :F:,1r..9p_eq_g 
co aJ gnd St~. e J:...-9 .. £~E:~.!E.i t z 
Herr Krupp has jufft brou13:ht off a ren1arKable coup. 
He is to merge his gree:.t coal and steel subsidiary, the 
Hheinhausen gro1ip, vvi th a simLLrr th'.mgh smaller concern, 
the Bochumer Verein. And this desJ;ite the fact that he should 
not really have any coal or steel interssts at all. 
What is more, he has won appro7al for ~his Derger 
from the High Authority of che European Coal and Steel 
Community (E.C.S.C.) only three weex:s be)fore the expiry -
on January 31, 1959, - of the time limit within whl.ch he 
had to comply with the deconcentration of' i:.:idustry agreements 
be made five years ago with the British, French and United 
States Govcrm.ents. 
Far from complying, he ai:,pears to l:>2 doing the very 
reverse - he has not ill fact finally decided on the merger -
and doing it with the ble::.,sing of the E.C.S.C., which has 
tru.st-busting and the fru.strc:;tioD of cartels as one of it:3 
key functions. How, it must be Gsked, bas this situation 
been allowed to develop ? Why hr:s the post-war at·tem;it to 
break the power of the leading Ruhr industri2.l barons 
come to nought ? 
The golicy of Lreaki:i:1g down German heavy industry, 
in _particular the coal and steel sect ors, v:as in fact never 
pur·s1.1e:l vsr;r effectively or consistently, and wc.s eventually 
subordinc=;,tec1 to the aim of restoring the German economy. 
The basic legislation is to be found in Allied occupation 
Law No, 27, which singled out the nine lnrgest coal and 
steel firrns for break-down into f6r-tJ-two units. The ovmers 
of the old firms were to be fully cornpe.twated by shares in 
the ne-1N firms, :i;irovi.ded. thF1.t t118y did. not take a majority 
holding in more than a.n;y one of the:~i:~. This mea:1t that the 
'.rl1ysf,.en, Wolf, Krupp and other i'(:'ww.ilies hr:td to sell out 
subject to being able to find buyers willing to offer 
reasonabJ.e ter 11..s. In the case of Kr1J.IJ:P there was the further 
obligation to sell out of coal and steel altogether. 
Krupp diver~1tcd himself oi' three concerns, but was 
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unable to find a buyer for the gre2.t coo.l and. ste.::~l combine, 
the Rheinhausen group, which in 1957/58 had a turn-over of 
,f.105 million. I ·t· ·1' S ""' y•lA c; r ~ .l.....,t.., . L~,.-.,_th,, scr.,rcely sur_prising that no 
serious buyer ca11te fol'ward, gj_VE:!n triat no obligation was 
imposed to sell except on favourable ter1;1s. A few offers 
were made, but they C?I;1e to notLL1g. 
Meantime, Krupp tu_i,r,ed his energies to engineering 
a:nd built up the huge Essen group, with a turn-over in 
1957/S,8 of £187 million, rangL1g from shipbuilding, locomotives 
and other vehicle const:ructi:.m to civil engineering and 
eve.r1 housing. He now aims c::~t uniting the R.heinhausen group 
1.vith Bochumer Verein, a concern which last yecl,r had & 
turn-over of £61 millicm. Bcchumer Vere in itself combines 
a coal company formerly owned bJ K:r-u.pp -· ons: of thr2e concerns 
he se, lrl ur.der Law tTo. 27 - with one of the thirteen components 
of what W,:'S be.:t'ore the wc,r the bigg::-,st by far of all Gern:,an 
Steel concerns. The:3e two unitr3 composing :.Sochurner V:::rein were 
acquired under Law No. 27 by 8, Swedish fLnar.:cier, v1ho has 
offered Krupp an option on 75% of ·their caJital. Should 
Krupp t£drn up this o:rtio:n, as he almcs~ ce~ct::dnly will, he 
will control about 4 1r.illi.on tons 9 or 16-ic, of Germany's 
current steel capac:Lty, plus about 6 :;nillion tons, or 5 %, 
of hard coal output. 
Other Gsrraan i.ndustrialists who prof'i t ed under the 
Nazi regime, ,,c.:xcept for Krupp 9 have so fa,r complied with the 
letter of L2}N No. 2?. There refac:dn, however 1 three Cc:LSGS 
in wbj_e;h th-2 t:une limits for dGcrirtellisetion have not yet 
r:J.J'l Cu. t . _,e[;e cnE>es, DB also Krupp' s, st:r·e now to be subjected 
COTllJci:;i.ng three nominc,es f'ro1.1 the West G,;r~nan Government, 
one nominee from each of the British, F::::',::Ech and U.S. 
Goverl'lilients, and one co-opted t,rnernber who should in theory 
mediate between the Germans t::lY1d the former occupying powers. 
The Commission, v1llich has started its investigatior1.s, has 
first to consider X.rup_p's application for a one-year extension 
to the time l~nit (which has already expired) and then to 
decide whether to release Kru:pil fror2 his obligations altogether, 
as the Germ.an Government has urged. 
The~ decision of the E.C.S.C. to approve Krupp's 
proposed uerger dooe not formally i1~luence the outcome one 
way or the ottwr. The issue was judged on q_uite different 
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grounds from those embodied in the Occupation Law, 1ia111ely 
those defined in th.J :E .C .s .C. '.Creaty. According to this the 
High Aut1:10rity of the E.c.s.c. has to decide whether or not 
an agreement betvveen firms or concentrations of firms will 
be in restraint of trade. 
A number of oriteria are set forth, such as price 
fixing, restriction of production, technical development or 
investment, and the allocation of markets, products, 
customers or sources of supply. Unless the ru.l2s of 
competition laid down in the Treaty look like being evaded 
by securing an artificially privileged position, the High 
Authority is bound to agree to a merger. If it refuses, the 
case may be taken to the European Court of Justice for 
arbitration. 
In the L""'llpp instance there was no clear evidence that 
these rules would be violated. The two coal and steel 
concerns already carried out the bulk of their business with 
one another, so that their combinr1.tion would merely formalise 
the high degree of :practical integration existing. Moreover, 
in term.s of the European Coal and Steel Co:ramuni ty as f'. whole, 
the :merged firms would be fn.r from domirn:mt, their combined 
coal output amounting to only 3% of Community production, 
while for crude st::el the propostion would be 5. 5?L 
Several other fir..IJ.s in the Coamunity are of a:pproxiBatley 
tl"e same size, and none enjoy as dominating a positior, as the 
1s?,c1iug U.~·. or even British steel giants in their markets. 
::I\,c 1::·>"h ! .,-i: :wri ';y inevitably judged tt.;:~ c1uestion of dominance 
~ :· the whole Community and nc '.: .2:rnt of the r;.1ember 
m:1:~io:us, lJecause the IJ.arlrnt is now c o:,r..:) ~- 0 :, ·"ly unified. It could 
hard 1Y have overruled the Krupp applicatj_on for bringing about 
undue concentration in Germany alone, when approval had 
previously been gi7en to the :Belgian steel firrns Cockerill 
and Ougrec:; Marihaye which jointly account for a very large 
proportion of Belgian output but only 4% of the Comrrm.nity' s 
output. 
The High Authority has stressed the fact that the 
decision over the merger concerned only its ecct:.omic 
implications, and not the political as:pects involved in the 
Allied Occupation Law. This view of the High Authority's 
functions is based on the Paris agreements ( Article 9) of 
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October 1957, which grantE::d We::'.5t Germany its sov,~reignty. 
1
.rhe West German Gove:cnment was made r29:ponsible for applying 
the nefasures for decartellising the Ruhr, while the Ji:.c.s.c. 
·was given the task of checking further cartellisation in 
accordance with the terms of its own treat;y-. Consequently 
the High Authority has claimed that it is not concerned with 
the question of the ownership of the Krupp coal and steel 
eDpire, thereby leaving the issue to the special inter-
governmental COIDIJission which has been set up. 
It is understandable that the High Authority, whose 
members have all reached the end of their terms of office, shoul~ 
not wish to stir the hornets' nest of controversy about 
Kr,.,_pp. But in f'<:.wt t,1e E.C.S.C. is more closely implicated 
than may seem to be the case, despite the legal doubts 
abcut the powers which can be exercised. 
The High Authority has in any case imposer1 one 
major limitation on Krupp. It requires him to obtain 
special per.mission for all extensions to plant. The purpose 
of this· is to guard against his attainj_ng a. dominant position 
in the future. It was clearly appreciated that Krupp, 
having extensive financial resources, might well become too 
powerful again. 
This r13straint on Krupp, a power excerised by the High 
.Authority for the first time, evidently has implications going 
beyond the f or111e,l criteria on whj_ch the meTger was sanctioned. 
After all, a major re~son for the creation of the E.C.S.C. 
in the first place was, from the French point of view, to 
provide a1i international control of the Ruhr once the 
military occurJation was over. It is scarnely surprising 
therefore that the French govern:r1ent should be bringing 
the K:r·upp issue before the Council of Minister of the E.C.s.c. 
The French will certainly not allow the matter to go by 
defr::,ult. Monsieur Debre, the French Premier, holds very 
strong views on cartels 1 and has long hold that the High 
Jmthori ty should be armed with stronger povv12rs to deal with 
the:ra. 
Although the outcome of the Kru.pp issue remains 
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in doubt, exp,Jrience shows that the High Authority of the 
E.C.S.C. is in a weak position to take a firm line. 
Normally the Cour.cil of Mir..isters s(-o.rvcs e.,s a check on the 
High Authority, and there is nothing to indicate that this 
will be an exception. Here, clearly, is another field in 
which the High Authority's powers require to be strengthened, 
as the Socis,list parties of' tbe Six have long been urging. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
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EUROPE' s Imcrn COAL SUR.PLUS 
Grnve test for the Ji~uronean 
co a~ and S'~ e e.1 Corrmmni t y. 
The bitter general strike in Southern Belgiuni, which has 
just taken place in support of miners threatened with redundancy, 
is only the latest and gravest symptom of the coal crisis through-
out Western Europe. Du.ring 1958 a coal shortage suddenly gave 
way to a surplus owing to the general industrial recession. 
Al though production was largely maintainc~d, the drop in 
consumption has resulted in the accumulation of such massive 
coal surpluses that emergency measures are being taken to cut 
production by closing pits, laying off workers and extending 
short-time. 
Pithead stocks in Western Europe are more than twice the 
maximum amount ever before recorded. Du.ring 1958 they rose by 
two and a half tiues in Britain and by nearly three and a half 
times in the European Coal and Steel Community (:ECSC) 7 amongst 
whose members the worst affected were Belgium and West Gerri.1any; 
in these countries stocks rose by ten times. Including 
distributed coal as well, stocks in Britain at the end of 
January were just under 35 million tons, or the equivalent of 
two months normal production. In the ECSC coal stoclrn, now 
about 55 million tons, correspond to nearly three months 
normal production. 
Stocks hr:we risen to such proportions bl-;Cause the fall in 
consumption of coal and the increased competition from fuel oil 
did not immediately lead to cuts in production. Compared to 
1957 output in 1958 dropped by only J.5% to 215.8 million tons 
in Britain, and by as little as 0.6% to 246.4 million tons in 
the ECSC. In addition imports into the ECSC have been sustained 
at a high level, thereby very much aggravating the situation i.n 
the absence of export outlets. Thus the ECSC has faced more 
acute difficulties, despite the :fact that the decline in con-
sumption came later than in Britain and was less marked. 
Last December a conference was convened in London by the 
Miners' International Federation to consider what steps should 
be taken to cope with the coal surplus, and the dangers this 
created for miners' living standards. The miners' unions decided 
to urge their gover:runents, the J<:csc and ott1er international 
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organisations to adopt policies to ensure full employment by 
allowing coal stocks to build up, when nece;..'Jsary by offering 
financial inducements to stock as long as the recession lasted. 
In addition, besides recommending specific measures to make coal 
more competitive and to restrict imports, the unions agreed to 
embark upon a campaign for shorter working hours without loss 
of pay. 
Broadly speaking the High Authority, the executive body of 
the ECSC, has tried to pursue a policy incorporating the main 
elements of this programme. Last May Monsieur Finet, President 
• 
of the High Authority and a former Belgian trade union leader, 
declared that irA determ.ined effort will have to be made to prevent 
unemployment from following on the heels of shortage, and shortage 
on the heels of unemployment, as has so often happened in the past." 
In pursuit of this aim, the High Authority proposed the 
formation of buffer stocks to stabilise employment and to provide 
a reserve against a recovery in demand. Finance was to be 
provided by a sma.11 levy on all coal sold in the Commumty. 
The scheme was turned down by the Council of Ministers, represen-
ting the mero.ber governments, as a result in particular of the 
German insistance that more stress should be placed on making 
coal competitive. This applied to Belgium coal especially, 
which was the first to encounter serious marketing difficulties, 
owing the high costs of production of the Southern Belgian pits. 
:By the autumn, however, the Germ.Ems were also meeting 
dif±'icul ties, mainly owing to the high level or'"i.uiports. A 
much less ambitious plan for financing coal stocks then gained 
support, and on the High Authority's insistance the plan has 
since improved somewhat. The High Authority is now to devote 
about £3.5 million to finance pithead stocks accumulated since 
last September and which exceed 30 days production at individual 
collieries. Allocations by the High Authority are made condit-
ionally upon a sirt1ilar grant from the member govermnents concerned. 
In order to take even this limited step, the High Authority is 
having to raid its readaptation funds, which are intended to 
assist displaced workers in obtaining new employment. The 
justification given is that this is the best safeguard for 
workers to which the funds could be devoted in the circumstances. 
I 
The other major respect in which the High Authority might 
have been able to stem the crisis concerns imports. 
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Unfortunately it has no effective power to act, a weakness in 
the :ECSC which Monsieur Finet has labelled an absurdity in view 
of the fact that the European :P~co:nomic Community ( the Com1c10n 
Market), which has precisely the same member countries, has 
the coordination of foreign trade policy as a major objective. 
The result can be judged from the fact that imports into the 
Community totalled some 31 million tons in 1958, about as much 
as the increase in stocks during the year. The imports were 
made r..;.ainly under long term contracts negotiated with the USA, 
and with the active encouragement of the High Authority, during the 
earlier shortage. In addition Poland has been dumping fairly 
large quantities of coal in the Community. 
As a first step the High Authority, anxious to relate import 
contracts to long term needs, asked member governments for 
detailed infoma.tion relating to these long term contracts, but 
received little practical assistance. The ideal would have been 
the adoption of a system like the French one whereby the sales 
organisation of the nationalised industry has to be informed of 
all intended imports, and may refuse to give its sanction. 
However, the High Authority was able to use its prestige with the 
USA to cancel or postpone some of the contracts made; imports 
from the USA in 1958 were in fact 11 million tons less than in 
1957, and a further reduction will take place in 1959. :But so 
far it has not proved possible to obtain properly concerted 
action to control imports. The Dutch and the Italians, bo:th 
almost entirely depE::11dent on imports, have made little effort to 
switch from Ai.'llerican and Polish suppliers to Coil.ffiluni ty coal partly 
on grounds of cost, and :partly because they do not wish to have 
to switch back again should Community coal become short again. 
The French have not been much worried since they have kept imports 
from outside the Community largely under control. 
It was therefore for want of any better measure that the 
High Authority gave its approval in January to German unilateral 
action in imposing a duty of £1.14.0 per ton on coal imports 
exceeding 5 million tons in 1959. The duty is estimated to 
equal the cost of cancelling contracts with the USA, so that it 
is likely to act as an effective check to imports exceeding the 
nuty-froe quotr.,. The scheue has alrc0.dy resulted in vigoroµs 
:protests fro::... the USA, Bri tr•,ih 1 Lnd r..:;.ost Gcr-.c.;2,n consumer groups, 
so that its final shape reuains to be determined. 
The Gern1an gover:nrnent, by e,cting unilaterally, gave 
encouragement to the Belgian government to follow suit. The 
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latter having for many 11onths past called upon the High Authority 
without success to declare a state of "manifest crisis", recently 
threatened to seal Belgian frontiers against coal imports from 
other members of the Community as well as from the rest of the 
world. Were the High Authority, having obtained sufficient support 
from the Council of Ministers, to declare a "raanifest crisis" 
it would then be entitlGd to fix production and import quotas 
for the entire Community. 
At first the High Authority refused to take such action, on 
the grounds that under the Treaty indirect measures must be 
exhausted first. In addition the Council of Mi.nisters would 
almost certainly not have agreed that a manifest crisis existed. 
The general strike in Southern Belgiu@, however, has sufficiently 
altered the poli tj .. cal si tu.at ion in the Cornn:m.ni ty to r:1ake agreement 
on the existence of a manifest crisis rmch 11ore likely. 
The Belgian problem, unlike that in Germa.ny, is long-term 
and fundamental. Only one third of Belgium's annual output of 
30 million tons of coal is produced competitively with coal in 
the rest of the Community; on average Belgian costs are 40~b 
higher. The problem was recognised when the ECSC was created, 
a special lev"y on German and Dutch coal being instituted to 
enable Belgian mines to compete. They received £17.8 million 
from this source, plus half as nuch again from national sources 
under a scheme operated by the High Authority. But the boom 
conditions during most of the five years operation of this 
compensati.011 scheme gave little incentive to reorganise the 
industry adequately. 
The full rigours of the recession have thus coincided 
with the steps designed to close pits with a combined output of 
5-5 nillion tons a year. Other members of the Community and the 
Hi1/~' LTr.hori ty itself would not consent to any further relief 
for Beigium unless the closures were carried out. The g:eneral 
strike, however, even if it does not contribute to the declaration 
of a manifest crisis, looks like bringing about a temporary 
reprieve long enough to enable new industries to be sited in the 
affected areas and to allow the High Authority's generous 
compensation for workers (80% of full wages on average for a 
year) to be adequate in the circumstances. In addition, the 
general strike has brought home to the Belgian Goverrunent the 
need for a more vigorous regional development programme, and 
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given force to the miners' demands for nationalising the coal 
industry. 
None of thG hlajor measures ta.ken - financing stocks, German 
import duties, and a more long·-drawn programme for closing 
uneconomic Belgian pits - will solve the coal crisis. This 
depends upon an upturn in economic activity. But m1::tny steps 
can be taken to soften the impact and lessen the hardship. 
For inst2-nce, the High Authority has already persuaded governm.,?nts 
to reduce some of the tax and other advantages enjoyed by oil 
distributors; encouraged consumers such as public utilities to 
place long term contracts for Community coal; and allowed special 
price reductions to be made in these cases. 
What are the lessons to be drawn from what is groving to be 
by far the most severe test yet faced by the ECSC? Blrune for 
the crisis can be laid at many doors. Whatever criticisms are 
being made of individual decisions by the High Authority, the 
main lesson would seem to be thRt its powers are too weak to 
meet this sort of situation. For years it has put pressure on 
governrnents to adopt a Miners' Code which would safeguard miners 
fr,)L'.l the very hardships they are now facing. As regards 
gc :::.,.sral policy, it is only with the greatest diffj_cul ty that 
tt,:: High Authority has managed to wim, the cooperation of 
g:)· .. cr:nments in even a fairly restricted coordination of approach 
to the crisis. This is not to decry the real and positive 
achievements. What is lacking is the power to develop n.n 
effecttve comm.on policy for the whole Co;nmuni ty on the long term. 
* . * * * * * * * 
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SOCIALI'.'.:T INTERNATIONAL 
•. -
CALLS FOR STRONG:SR EUROPE 
European Socialists fe.vour economic association 
with the Common IVIarket 
In recent months the socialist parties of Western 
Europe have been working out their attitude to the European 
Economic Association which the countries of the Common 
Market propose should replace the now defunct scheme for a 
European Free Trade Area. The details of the Association 
are still being discussed by the Cmmnission of the European 
Economic Comm.unity in Brus~"lels. They are due to be presented 
to the Community's Ministers early in March. Until they are 
made public it is evidently impossible for socialists or. 
trade unionists to have a definite policy. Nevertheless, 
from two recent meetings of European socialists - at ·which · 
the British Labour Party was represented - it is already 
possible to see the outlines of an Association which would 
be acceptable to them. 
It is clear that all a.re agreed that some form of 
association between the other western European countries -
including Great Britain - and the Common Market is esse:i.:.tial 
to reinforce the economic solidarity of a democratic Europe. 
This was the first point made in the final resolution passed 
by the Conference of Socialist Parties which was held in 
Brussels on December 17-18 last. An earlier meeting at 
Strasbourg made the s :.'.me point when it was argued that the 
"conclusion of such a treaty, accelerating as it would the 
ere at ion of a larger ec 0110:mj_c arGa, would encourage the 
increase of productivity and.facilitate the raising of the 
standard of living of the peoples". 
The second essential feature of such an Association 
is that it should not be inward-looking, but so constructed 
that it would contribut~ to the economic and social progress 
of countries in other parts of the world which are in the 
process of' further developme.nt. Its objective, it was 
agreed at the Strasbourg meet j_ng, should be "to bring the 
standard of living in those areas into line with that 
in member countries". 
In contrast to the abortive Free Trade Area project, 
it would also be concerned with much more than merely 
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freeing trade. It would be a much tighter association, 
equipped with the means of ensuring that its members 
would pursue policies of expansion, full employment and 
social progress. It would also have the task of "providing 
for measures of industrialization and the modernization of 
agriculture for the rapid expansion of the development areas 
within the Association", so that in such areas as southern 
Italy the standard of living could be brought closer to that 
in other more favoured areas. 
Members of the Association vvauld undertake, and give 
each other guarantees, that they would carry out common action 
in.the fields of economic, financial and monetary policy. 
None of these would be possible if each me~ber were completely 
free to fix customs duties at whatever level seemed best for 
the interests of a particular country, and so it was agreed 
in Brussels that each state which joined would give a 
voluntary undertaking to work towards the harmonization of 
duties. S1.:1.ch an undertaking would go a long way to meet the 
problem which the British Blue Book on the Free Trade negotiations 
underlined as one of the major problems of the British 
Government's 1Jroposals. Experts worked away for months in a 
morass of statistics and customs tables trying to find a way 
round the :problems which an unequal external tariff presented: 
none that was satisfactory to all parties was found. And in 
this respect it is significant that one of the recent, 
unofficial concessions which has been put forWE\rd from the 
British side is a harmonization of tariffs on industrial goods -
which the meeting at Brussels saw to be necessary even before 
the old negotiations had collape;ed. 
In short, the socialist parties claim that their 
approach offers a new and imaginative solution to a problem 
which, by common consent, is one of the most urgent which now 
faces the countries of western Europe. In this res_pect the 
British T.U.C. may claim to be a pioneer. As long ago as 
November 1956 it called its policy statement on these problems 
"Economic Association with Europe 11 • 
* * * * * * * * '* * 
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A social charter which will bring benefits to all 
European states is now being drafted by the Council of 
Europe. Its aim is to establish a common measure of social 
legislation throughout the fifteen member countries. 
Under the terms of the proposed Charter each countr~r 
will commit itself to a minimum number of basic rights and 
principles. 
These include the right (a) to work; (b) to just 
conditions of work and to safe and healthy working conditions; 
(c) to a fair wage; (d) to organize and barg:.:tin collectirely; 
(e) to special protection for children, young persons and 
employed women; ( f') to vocational training and g,J.idance; 
(g) to social security; (h) of the family to social and 
economic protection; (i) to engE1,ge in any occupation in 
the territory of any of the other countries who adopt 
the charter; (j) to l):rotection and a~1istance for migrant 
workers. The Charter also lays down methods for the 
effective supervision and implementation of the Charter's 
provisions. 
The Social Charter, it is claimed 7 will secure for 
the citizens of its members basic economic and social 
rights in the same way as the Convention on Human Rights 
guarantees civil and political rights. 
There are however important differences between 
the two charters. In the case of the Human Rights Convention 
two independent bodies of jurists - the European Commission 
and the European Court of H-lJ.JD.an Rights - determine whether 
any given right has been violated or not. In the case of 
the European Social Chr,.rter it will be the GovernmentB 
themselves who decide whether or not the obligations assumed 
under.the terms of the Charter have been carried out. 
Under the Charter the member countries will submit 
to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe periodical 
reports on the application of such provisions as they have 
undertaken, together with comments from national employers 
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and trade union organisations which are members of international 
employers or workers bodi.es. These reports and comruents will 
then be exari.ined by a body of independent experts who 
will submit the reports with their own recommendations 
to a Sub-Committee of the Social Committee of the Council. 
The I. L. O., the international employers- and trade 
union organisations will participate in a consultative 
capacity in the deliberations of the Sub-Committee. On 
the basis of the latter's report, the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe may make recommendations to its 
members. In the final instance, therefore, the Governments 
will determine the carrying-out of the Charter's provisions. 
Thus the Charter will be notably less "supranational" than 
the Convention on Hurr1an Rights. 
In December 1958 the draft European Social Charter 
was examined at a Conference convened by the International 
Labour Organization. This Conference was composed of 
representative national dslegE1.ticns comprising government, 
employer and worker delegstes. The British worker 
representative was Mr. Robert Willis, Chairman of the General 
Council of the T.U.C. 
The Conference, despite differences on certain points, 
was nevertheless able to reach agreement on a number of 
proposed modifications. 
Certain governmental and employers' delegates -
more particularly those of the Federal Republic of Germ.any -
felt that the "tripartite'' machinery proposed was not 
compatible with the structure of the Council of Europe 
which, they alleged, was governmental in 
character. This reactionary attitude was opposed by the 
workers' delegci.tes, and by the Belgian Government member, 
who considered that employers and workers should be more 
directly associated in the procedure of implementing the 
Charter so as to ensure democratic and effective 
supervision. 
A nunber of compromise solutions on social rights 
were ar1::,roved which, despite their relative weakness, 
nevertheless constitute an advance on the provisions as 
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originally drafted. This was particularly the case with 
the article on the right to work. The workers' delegates 
insisted that the right to work was a funda:r11entn,l right. 
The employers' repre3ente.,tives, however, and certain 
Goverw.ent delegates representing industrially under-
developed countries, 1:.ointed out that it was impossible 
to guarantee employment at all times to their entire 
working population. They agreed, however, in line with 
curr0nt British goverrunental policy, that it was dE.,sirable 
to aim at maintaining the highest lev(:-1 of employment 
compatible with a sound economy. 
Other Government delegates expressed thems13lves in 
favour of inserting in the Charter a reference to f'ull 
employment seeing that this was a well understood concept 
" 
in many Member Countries. On the proposn1 of the Italian 
Goverruricnt delegate - Italy suff e:rs from chronic uner;iployment -
a proposRl was adopted which undertook to accept as a 
primary aim the res:ponsibili ty for the achievement and 
maintenance of as high and stable a level of employ.rnent as 
possible, with a view to the attainm.errt of full employment. 
Another debate developed over the advisability of 
including in the Charter a refer0nce to the right of workers 
to strike. Here it was agreed that subject to the obligations 
arising out of collective agreements previously entered into, 
the right to strike should be included in the article on 
the right to bargain collectively. This was accepted by 
the employers' representatives - who, however, requested 
that the right to lockout should also be included. 
The Committee of Ministers will now examine the 
suggestions made by the Conference for improving the draft 
Charter and it is anticipated th::-.t it will pay the fullest 
!'egGrd to them, given the representative and authoritative 
character of the Conference. The final text, as adopted 
and brought into force by the Gover:nments, will almost 
certainly therefore be close to the revised draft. 
What real progress - if any - will its adoption 
represent ? 
In the first place it will forrn a c01-;imon basis in 
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the field of social legislation and practice. This is in 
accord with the Council of Evrope' s policy of grwJu.ally 
unifying the laws of its Men:.bc;r ~>tates in an ev,.0r-increasing 
numbe:r of fields - a policy tbD,t has been attended with 
quite considerable success. 
In the second place 1 for certain countries, the 
co:m:mi tments to be undertaken under the Charter J..Jark 
a distinct Bt8p forward by comIJarison with existing 
social legislation. This is of course less true for the 
"socially advanced" countrier3. Britain is b;ir no means 
altogether in the lead in this respect. The Scandinavian 
countries nust also look to their laurels. Were bo-th to 
accept all the provj_sions o:t· the Chartr~r they would bave to 
introduce fairly substfantigl c:1.anges in their lc:eislri.tion. 
Lastly, this detailed and searching collective 
exmnination by the Europ0ctn countri(:s of' their social 
achievements e,nd policior1 is valuable in itsf,lf. The 
Tripartite Conference re_prescnt0d the first such gener::-•.l 
review at European level. It should be repeated. The 
Council, however, would be wise to regard its Chartsr only 
as a starting point: as a solid basis, useful as far as 
it goes, but inviting a rapid completion of the structure. 
The lesson of the rro1Josed Charter is that some 
measure of harinonis?.tion of social conditions in Europe 
is osE1ential. This rn::cessi.-ty has been recognised by the 
Si.x in the cree.tion of the Conmen Market, and the failure 
to recognise it was an in:;1ort8..nt factor in the breakdown 
of' the negotiations of a Free Trade Area. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
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